Financial liberalization, innovation and the response of Malaysian commercial banks’ portfolios to monetary shocks by Noor Azlan Ghazali,
Jurnal Pengurusan 18 (1999) 39-53
Liberalization, Innovation and the Response
of Malaysian Commercial Banks' Portfolios
to Monetary Shocks
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ABSTMCT
tmt theoretical papers have shown that banking institutions posses
rcle in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. The
6banl6 toward changes in monetary conditions, particularly their
dbcations, determine the ultimate impact of monetary policy on
In addition, several findings also indicate the changing
$ commercial banlcs in recent years due to the development of
m*cts and liberalization process which begin since early eighties.
aonines this issue for the Malaysian banking industry. Without
liheralization and innovation that occur in the Malaysianfinancial
fue early eighties also affect the way banks respond to changes in
dicy. It is shown that banks resort to competitive funds and
funidation in their attempt to shield the lending capacity. This is
byt the recent development in the banking industry' It is argued
eml bank loses to some extent, its direct inJluence on banks
futions, thus, reducing the effectiveness of monetary policy.
* tqtsmission rpechanisrn of monetary policy, therefore requires
to the behaviour of banking firms.
ABSTP.I.K
tdfum teoretikal kebelakangan ini menuniukkan bahawa institusi
inlcan perarwnyang penting di dalam transmisi polisi monetari.
fu* terhadap perubahan di dalam polisi monetari, terutamanya
prtfolio mereka mempengaruhi kesan muktamad polisi monetari
ibnar. Di samping itu beberapa leajian menuniukkan perubahan
futk akibat dari pembangunan di dalam pasaran kewangan dan
Efuralisasi yang bermula seiak awal lapan puluhan. Kajian ini
pful berkaitan bagi industri perbanknn di Malaysia. Keputusan
fuIuwa sistem perbankan di Malaysia juga tidak terkecuali
,q wno- Proses liberalisasi dan inovasi lcewangan mempengarahi
b*urludap perubahan di dalam polisi monetai. Bank didapati
ponfolio pinjaman mereka dengan cara mencairl<nn ponfolio
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pelaburan ataupun mempertingkatkan piniaman luar' Kesemuanya int
'Lterkemungkinan hasil dai pembingunan sistem kewangan sejak awal lapan
ii"n*ryZ"s berlaku di Milaysia' Olehyang demikian' keupayaan bankpusat
'wmk 
mimpingaruhi perletaian portfolio institusi bqnk adalah berkurangan
dan ini seterusnya mengurangkan keberkesanan polisi monetari' Pene-ntuan
saluran transmisi polisi-moneiari seharusnya memberi perhatian yang khusus
ke atas tingkahlaku firma p erbankan'
INTRODUCTION
The role of banking firms in transmitting the effect of monetary policy on
real economic activity has receivecl significant attention by researchers in recent
years. fraOitional models of monetary equilibrium despite being able to
generate the shortrun non-neutrality of money fail to incorporate an active
ilte for Uanting f,ms in the transmission process (Giossman and Weiss (1983),
Rotemberg (1t84), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992)' and Fuerst (1992))'
No specii role is assigned to banking firms except on their liability side (i'e'
demand deposits) *hi"h 
"o-prises 
the money supply' Since 
-monetary
authority has direct control over the amount of demand deposits that can be
issued, banks posses no special role in the transmission process' This is
parafbf to Farna (1980) who argues that banks are passive economic agents
whichhavenoeffecto,th"g"n"'ulequilibriumoftheeconomyandthattheir
activitiesfallundertheModigliani-Miller(1958)theoremontheirrelevance
of the pure financing decision.
Recent models by Fuerst (lgg4) and Labadie (1995) assigned a more
active role for banks in the transmission process' It is shown that the
effectiveness of monetary policy relies greatly on how banks respond to
monetary injections. tn aiaition, the process of deregulation and financial
innovatitn which began in the early 1980's, necessitate new explanations to
theworkingsofmonetarypolicyastheyblurthedefinitionofmoney,create
new assets which are cloie substitutes to money, and seriously affect the roles
of commercial banks in the economy (see Edward (1995) and Edward and
Mishkin (1995))' The changing role of banks brought by deregulation and
innovation could affect the effectiveness of monetary policy'
In contrast to Fama (1980), Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993:.14)' in
reviewing contemporary banking theory, state that ""'intermediation is a
response-to the inability of market mediated mechanisms to efficiently
resolveinformationalproblems''.welfareoftransactingpartiesshould
improve when they use ianks". Thus, from the perspective oftanking theory
uanksarespecialandplayanimportantroleininfluencingtheefficiencyof
the economy. The transmission mechanism of monetary policy can be better
analyzedbystudyingbanks'reactionstochangesinmonetarypolicy.Inthis
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md1', this is accomplished by analyzing the response of bank balance sheets
5 chenges in monetary conditions. The following sections are categorized as
fr{[os5. The second section discusses recent findings on issues related to the
StEct The data and method of empirical tests are explained in the third
mion. This is followed by the discussion on the findings in the fourth
rttioo. The paper ends with a brief summary and implications.
BANKS' REACTIONS TO MONETARY POLICY
Ihirrs studies have been performed in analyzing the impact of monetary policy
,om the components of bank balance sheets. Most of the existing
iffiiffirtgs relate the status of the influence to the process of financial liberalization
d innovation that occur in recent years. Thornton (1994) identifies the wea-
nmdnE relationship between reserves and loans following the Monetary Control
fid of 1980. He performs regression analysis between loans and reserves for
um mb-periods, 1959-1979 and 1980-1993. Loans and reserves are positively
ld sipificantly associated for the pre-1980 period, but the significant link
''rqears after 1980. Financial innovation and deregulation are argued to be the
udr frcton behind this weakening relationship. Morris and Sellon (1995) evaluate
& Iink of bank lending with reserves availability. Little evidence are found toqput the view that bank lending is constrained by the availability of reserves.
smcfrps investigating the transmission mechanism of monetary policy indicate
illEGitical role of bank lending in transmitting changes in monetary policy (see
Orrmnrnke and Blinder (1988), Bernanke and Gertler (1995), and Kasyhap and
&itr {1994, 1995). To the extent that bank lending is the channel through which
r@ry policy is transmitted'into the ebonomy, deregulation therefore reduces
&cffectiveness of monetary policy.
The progress of liquidity management, especially the availability of
,pm'lnEd funds (e.g. certificates of deposits (cos), inter-bank borrowing, Euro-
,nnnm' rqurchase agreements (REpos)) and the buying/selling of liquid securi-
mircr" sould also reduce monetary influence on bank balance sheets. In
m*rrisring their profit objectives banks may choose to shield their loan
pum$olios by adjusting other components of the balance sheets such as
irinmr:aqing their purchased funds which can be attracted at a competitive rates.
Dmnpr and Romer (1990) argue that banks resorted to Cos financing when
rmmrr""]'policy is contracted. They note that the spread between interest rates
r@ @ and commercial paper increases as tight monetary policy occurs. This
rrmuffis banks attempt to insulate their loan portfolios from declining by
iri*mt'!frg new CDs. It is also possible that banks refuse to cut their lending as
mimies which form the secondary reserves for banks. These securities
iEryuMon strategies are cost effective when compared to liquidation of the
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illiquid loans. Returns from loans are maximized if bank holds them 
until
,."iriif trta"rton rqSgi' Market inefficiency-.in valuing bank loans due to
the informationut ury**"t'y ptoUt"*t has discouraged banks fr91 ylVing
on loan liquidation u. 
" 
toioiion to liquidity problems' As discussed in Keeton
(1993), contraction i. to"*"t migi't noi iead to a reduction in bank loans
but instead *uy in.'"u'" the iss'uance of non-deposit liabilities and/or
liquidation of securities held' This tendency to revert to 
purchased funds and/
or liquidation of ,""u'iii"' impede the efiects of monetary contraction' The
direct influence of -";;1;t;'thority on the amount of loans issued by
commercial banks is 
'eateneO 
if banks attempt to insulate their loan
portfolios from being 
"if"ti"J 
UV changes in monetary policy' Changes in
institutional features um"", ,rr" way banks response to 
monetary policy'
Tracing the reactions oflu*tio*ard changes in monetary policy can be
p"rf;;;;;y e^alinins the dvnamic of balance sheets components
following monetary tn1""iiin or contraction' Bernanke and 
Blinder (1992) and
Gertler and Gilchrist (i;;;t show that bank deposits and securities drop as
policy is tightened. O'i;il some lag do bank loans start to decline' A more
extensive analysis of ihe impact of monetary policy-on_bank 
p.ortfolios'
similar to that or n"*unt:" uii srinaff is performed by McMillin 
(1996). An
eight variabl" uo* *od"l is estimated in analyzing the response of bank
portfolios to moneta'y Jo"t' proxied b.1 the federal funds rate and non-
borrowed reserves (Nnn)' A similar pattern to Bernanke and Blinder 
is
identified, regardless of the monetary indicators used' In 
a similar framework'
Kashyap and Stein irqqSl analyzeih" '"'pont" 
of banks varying in size to
monetary shocks uu'"i on iunt ptont -u^1*i'i'g behavior' It is shown that
small banks toun* o"Jir" more^significantly tha-n those of the large banks
whenever tlgt t *on"v poli; is i*p;*9nted' on the other hand' small banks'
securities holdings 
'"'ionO 'ignidcantly 
less than large banks' to monetary
tightening. Thus, diff#nt"'in bank response may also be due to market
imperfection which affect banks' ability to shield their loan 
portfolio'
The existing findings generally support-the view that liberalization 
and
innovation ttur" ,"iu"Zo it'" i'riutnce or monetary authority on banks
;1Xr?it:"1;ff;r:;r*'' reactions to monetarv poticv particularlv their
loanportfoliosarenotdirectandtheirattempttoshieldthelenciingactivity
is evidenced by the adjustments in other components of bank balance 
sheets'
Thisweakensthedirectin{luenceofmonetaryauttrorityonbankbalancesheets.
i":*, 
-"."ary authority loses its directinfluence on the banking 
sector as
deregulation and irnovuiion take place' These findings are 
largely based on
the experience in the United Staies' However' financial liberalization 
and
innovation are taking pfu"" in-uf*ost all nations' In the case 
of Malaysia'
financial liberalization;; ; eJy eigtrties' Today' Malaysian commercial
bankshavewiderchoicesasalternativestoattractfunds.Thedevelopmentof
priir" 
".0 private 
debt markets and establishment of National Mortgage
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obryration (cagamas Bhd.) introduce additional flexibilities for banks in
,-qgrng their liquidity positions. In addition, the establishment offtiraives markets such as the Kuala Lumpur options and Financial FuturesD-rr-qge (rrorre) and the Malaysian Monetary Exchange (uue) also offer
a bedging opportunities for commercial banks that might affect the
ains of commercial banks to changes in monetary policy. Thus, the
*ning influence of monetary authority on the portfolios of commercialB could also prevail in Malaysia. This study attempts to evaluate thesehr in the Malaysian banking industry.
DATA AND METTIODOLOGY
nr fu Malaysian commercial banks balance sheets is extracted from they bulletin issued by the cenrral bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara
ryryda) and macroeconomics variables are down loaded from the IFs cD-
mpiled by Intemational Monetary Funds (rrrar). The data set beginsl9ll:I to 1994:IY, which spans a period of twenty four years. In additionE urhole period analysis, the focus is given for the period of l9g0:I to
as this reflects the liberalization years in Malaysian banking
Quarterly observations of the following time series are used in thi
analysis; money supply (Ml), Consumer price Index, Industrial
lndex, demand deposits held by commercial banks, securities
of commercial banks, loans issued by commercial banks, and
funds held by commercial banks (fixed deposits, bankers
cDs, and inter-bank borrowing).[brftns studies employ several ireasures such as monetary aggregates,
ttll rates, non-borrowed reserves to represent monetary indicator (see
Plosser (1984), Bemanke and Blinder (l9g}),Friedmand and Kuttner
Echenbaum (1992) and Strongin (1995) for discussion on the use of
,ggregates, short term rates, and non-borrowed reserve as monetary
t- A group of researchers apply a dating procedure to measure
policy (see Romer and Romer (1990), Boschen and Mills (lgg2),his and Sellon (1995). This method identify changes in monetary
lkough a date that signifies Feds policy. Changes in monetary
h is used to represent monetary innovations in this study. In the case
aria, interest rates determination was liberalized in the eighties. prior
a:rcst rates were administered by the central bank. Thus, precluding
n;ng them as monetary indicators. Data on non-borrowed reservei
ne{y available. The consumer price index and industrial production
:fochded in the model to capture the aggregate demand factors. Thus,L monetary policy can affect bank balance sheet either directly on
ptkough its influence on aggregate demand. The goal of the analysis
A,- (L)-l F,,,1 lTu,,l l
A2. (L) I l**, I lt,J I
o.. ru__] LlJ [,.,]_] (r)
F,ll fo,,l l-o,, ttl l-n,, G-)
I *,, I lA, l+1A2, G) I 14, G)
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is to examine the response of banks' portfolios to changes in monetary policy.
Particular emphasis is given to the pattern of responses of the loans,
securities, and purchased funds held by commercial banks. Liberalization and
innovations are hypothesized to delay bank loans response to monetary
tightening as banks shield their loan portfolios through liquidation of
securities and by attracting a more competitive sources of funds.
The empirical analysis conducted in this study is based on a vector
autoregressions (ven) methodology introduced by Sims (1980). This method
allows relaxation of structural specifications and lets the data specify the
dynamic structure of the model itsetf. It involves simultaneous estimations of
a system of variables which affect each other in an autoregressive pattem. A
Vln i, basically an extension of a univariate autoregressive process that
a110ws a vector of variables to be included in the model. A vector of m
variables X, = (x,,, Xr,r.....r x*)'can be represented in a ven system as follows:
where A. o represents the intercept terms and Arj G) is the polynomials in the
tug op".iiotl. The reduced form error vr has hean zero,,E[v,] = 0' and the
"i*i*"" matrix ), = E[v, v,'l for all t' Furthermore' v, and-v. are uncorrelatedfor t + s. The estimation procedure is simplified by the autoregressive
specification. Throughout the analysis we used four quarter lag for all
variables which is sufficient to capture the short and long run effect of monetary
shocks. Since all of the right-hand-side variables are pre-determined and the
same for each equation, ordinary least square (or-s) yields a consistent and
asymptotically efficient estimator. Seemingly unrelated regression (SUn) does
not uOa to the efficiency of the estimation because of the identical regressors'
Two forms of analysis are performed for this study, i.e. impulse response
functions analysis and variance decompositions analysis. The dynamic
responses among the variables in the sysrcm toward each other are presented by
the impulse."rpont. functions analysis. The impulse response functions depict
the response of a variable towards one standard error innovation in one of the
variabie in the system. This analysis involves shocking one of the equation's
disturbance terms and tracing the sign and magnitude of the system's response
to the shocks over a period of time. The variance decomposition analysis iden-
tifies the sources of shocks that contribute to the forecast error variance of each
of the variables in the system. This is achieved by decomposing the n-step ahead
forecast error variance into each one of the shocks in the system. The estima-
tions are also performed for different categories of loans varying in maturity
_-
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{rrtterm (less than 1 year), medium term (l to 4 years), and long term loans
f:*rthan 4 years)). This provides us more information on the sensitivity of
H'loans according to its maturity structure.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
L dJrnamic pattems that describe the inter-relationship between monetary
rff*& and bank balance sheets components (loans, securities, and purchased
H) are depicted in Figure 1. The impulse response functions show thef,r!ilce of bank balance sheets components following monetary contraction.
-qonses for the whole period (1971:I-1994:IV) are shown in the firstfu of Figure 1. Total bank lending declines immediately followingEy contraction. The decline persists throughout the horizon reported
.ffi is twelve quarters. There is minimal evidence to support banks
:ffig treir loan portfolios. The slight decline in securities in the first three
,trtf,s provides some support for banks trying to shield their loans.
frcrr,the shielding effort is not significant as it fails to prevent decline
ftElending. There is no indication that banks resort to competitive funds
pctasea habilities also decline parallel with the amount of loans issued.
that banks react in parallel fashion to changes in monetary policy.
cen therefore be considered passive in their strategies with regard to
policy. The inability of commercial banks to shield their loan
when the whole period data is used is expected as it incorporates
l!}Ib &ring which the financial markets are still very much regulatedk &veloped with limited financial products available. This also
lhe greater influence of central bank on banks' portfolio allocation.
-'lses using disaggregated loan portfolios of different maturities areL tte second, third and fourth rows of Figure l. In general, the pattern
calier remains. However, decline in loans is slightly delayed for
r*m and long term loans. For the whole period analysis, greater
cffst is taced for longer term loans. In addition to the liquidation
banks also attempt to prevent the decline in their longer term
lr macting purchased liabilities. This is especially true for loans
gcater than 4 years. In contrast, short term loans decline imme-
Howing monetary tightening. Thus, banks are selective in deciding
of loan to protect. However, as shown by the impulses, banks
to totally prevent the decline in these loan portfolios. In the end,
by the central bank.
ere plotted in column two of Figure l. A different pattern of
re traced for this period. Focusing first on total loans, during the
197 l:l-1994:lY
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FIGURE 1. The response of banks balance sheets components
to monetary contractions
Erqlizatisl years, the effect of monetary contraction on bank lending is*ed and the decrine is delayed 
"r,". "u'"", 
a year. It is now obvious thar&omponents of bank baranl rr,""tr ua.;*t"d to offset the negative impactdmetary contraction on bank t.roinglufacity. As shown, Iiquidation ofGr;ties now takes nlace for a longer i..ioi fupproximately one year) and
-ehger scale as compareg jo th_" *1"fi p"i"A responses. In addirion, banks
'ft mw resort to competitive r*ot ir"rpporting their rending capaciry.trusea funds increasi forowing 
-or"r-ufi'.ortraction and its dynamic isIE to the pattern of loans. This-is u ,lgnin._t evidence supporting banks#*Eng their roan portforios. rn" r"rp,ir" oi uurt , p"nr"riJr'r"'.in"ooE^ction changes in recent years thai witnessed financial market riberaliza_h ad innovarion. Liberalizatio;,-irr;;;;"n of banking products and*dqment of financial markets 
"*,r*il";ternarives ava,able to banks
mr,:",T::,"jyjl]toy.iliseil t;dicate the lower ability of the
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E bank to directty intiuence u.rt, p"nrl'ri* ffi, ;.Ju"j#lH [I:lhs; vi r-uuntrrafy pollcy.lh disaggregated loan analysis provide additionar information on bankres" contrasting response is dictated for short term loans. short terrnrt now almost totally insulated from monetary contraction. Thee in medium term loans is also ,"a*J. Cimparing with the whole-' e tendency for bank to-shield tt 
"ir 
.t oni# roans increase signifi-3::::l 5ji1l"-: of impurses f* ;; ffi ,".* roans show ress
1a of bank protecting this category or toars as compared to the earlier
H:T,"::1,_"r::r"l* orioum b"rk;;.pt to ofrset decline inibatng is supported by ronger *a r*g"ri,q;iffi;;'::HT:TlT
ff:.lil"p:" funds. ihe pro""ri oidnanciar riberalization andt have change the response of banks portiotio, to monetaryDecline in lbans is delayed o, pr"r"rt"d'Uy- ui:rrt n"nt in otherof banj batance sheets particui*r, rlqrriiuln-or securiries andnew funds at a competitive rate.E 
',and 
2 provide the variance decompositions analysis for the van
AY:-:::.::]r:"abcve imputses. rhe io"u, or the analysis is tob &e percenrage of vr.riances or 
" 
p*i"i*;il;rff#:il;:
ft i explained by innovatio^ d;;;;;nd other balance sheetss (purchased funds and securiries). firrrJrf-l'ii#;;il;:
:**:::::**:** monetaryinnuen"e on bank lending bure ft influence of orhertalance sheetl comil;.';fiIr;ffi1#
Hry1{:l *ll". t..The.percer"g" 
"i-rl#*ce of the toral toansriac ro money variabte reduces ;;; ;; til;; *',*l"l,[ i"#lH:*'::::11.:::il','*gi","i Jp,"i* about 4 ro e perrrianc€ in loans but when onry tr," io.;_:r#;#ir-#; in"J
I*T:,r:,:^::ig: of 1 to.5 per."ni. on',r,e other hand, rhe@ainea by other balance sheeis compor"riJn.r"*ed dramati_
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TABLE l. Variance decompositions analysis
a.Totalloans:Percentageofvarianceduetomoney,purchasedfundsand
securities
1971:I-1994:IV 1980:I-1994:IV
Purchased
Money Funds Securities
9.19 2.01 1.98
5.48 1.34 1.06
3.95 1.67 0.66
4.31 1.44 0.45
4.37 1.66 1.29
4.47 1.98 2.96
4.22 2.28 5.39
4.r7 2.62 8.58
4.20 3.03 11.77
4.42 3.49 14.92
4.69 3.93 t7.@
5.13 4.27 19.99
Sum Qtrs. MoneY3.98 I 3.59
2.40 2 3.02
2.34 3 5.36
1.90 4 4.L5
2.96 5 3.43
4.94 6 2.88
7.67 7 2.37
1t.20 8 2.00
14.8b g " r.74
18.41 l0 1.60
21.58 11 1.47
24.26 12 1.36
Funds Securities Sum
t.94 2.16 4.W
1.67 t.24 2.90
2.41 0.82 3.23
4.68 0.62 5.30
6.28 1.39 7.67
7.89 3.38 t1.27
13.16 4.85 8.00
20.10 6.16 26.25
26.23 7.43 33.6631.83 8.42 40.26
36.78 9.70 46.48
4r.16 10.91 52.W
Purchased
Qtrs.
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
l0
ll
12
b. Purchased funds and securities: Percentage of variance due to money
1971:I-1994:IV 1980:I-1994:tV
Qtr$.
I
2
3
4
Purchased
Funds
0.66
2.6t
2.06
1.82
2.30
3.2L
3.62
4.26
5.45
7,M
8.96
ll.ll
Securities
1.78
1.25
0.92
1.09
1.02
l.14
1.38
1.54
1.92
2.20
2.N
2.53
Qtrs.
I)
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
l0
l1
12
Purchased
Funds
8.50
8.14
8.71
8.50
7.55
7.69
8.91
10.30
12.72
15.77
18.01
18.78
Securities
14.02
10.18
7.57
6.86
5.97
6.15
5.81
5.56
5.09
4.85
4.il
4.48
5
6
7
8
9
l0
ll
t2
cally particularly the purchased funds after a one year perid' In sum'
percentage explained by purchased funds a1d secur^ities;yre*": lo,*jjlf Z to Zl pei cent prioi to the liberalization to 3 to 52 per cent during
liberalization period. The process of liberalization and innovation also al
banks to shield their loans by adjusting other components of balance
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TABLE 2. Variance decompositions analysis: Disaggregated loans
r Shut term loans; percentage of variance due to money, purchased funds and
securities
l97l:I-1994:Iy
I
u
3{
5r
f
Purchased
Money Funds Securities Sum9.96 0.51 2.02 2.s36.24 0.31 1.09 t.4o4.58 l.16 0.67 1.83
!28 1.11 0.58 t.6s3-88 2.20 0.87 3.07316 3.96 1.83 5.803.41 5.88 3.68 9.56
?23 8.01 6.62 t4.64
1r3 9.86 s.87 1s.733A n.$ 8.27 24.70L53 12.69 16.17 28.863]s8 t3.46 18.68 32.t3
Qtr1. Money Funds Securities Sum| 5.21 0.29 2.43 2.722 3.31 6.53 t.24 7.773 7.t5 7.22 0.78 8.004 6.08 10.34 0.53 10.875 4.69 11.20 1.30 12.506 4.33 Ir.84 3.61 15.467 4.08 14.60 s.66 20.258 3.88 18.00 7.71 25.719 3.80 20.85 g.4o 20.2slg 3.77 22ss 10.73 33.6711 3.s7 24.8t 12.10 36.st
1980:I-1994:IV
Purchased
1980:I-1994:IV
t2 3.34 26.70 :.:.s4 40.03
trnr l6a1s. percentage 
":.:Tff.... due to money, purchased funds and
Efll: l-1994:Is,t
hrchased
hnds Securities Sum etrs.It t.u2 0.00 1.02 I!!! 0.68 0.26 o.rt ;l.61 1.22 2.83 3Ltl 5.88 7.gg 4Ztl 9.18 |.2g 5Ln 11.85 13.62 6I50 13.10 14.s9 7r30 u.lt 15.41 8t-t5 14.57 15.71 g
r.03 14.99 16.02 l0(rgl 15.23 16.16 11ojs 1s.46 16.31 t2
Purchased
Money Funds Securities Sum4.45 0.13 1.52 1.65t.6t 1.53 0.65 2.t8t.25 r.ot 0.62 1.632.63 1.A4 1.07 2.12234 3.12 4.22 7.351.96 4.97 6.78 11.751.84 7.05 6.61 13.661.62 9.62 6.63 16.251.42 11.09 6.11 17.201.23 11.84 5.43 t7.271.06 12.33 5.21 17.540.95 12.53 5.42 17.9s
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c. Long term loans: Percentage "::ffi[r*e to 
money' purchased funds and
1980:I-1994:IV
1971:I-1994:IV
Purchased
Qtrs. MoneYI r.37
2 1.67
3 1.90
4 1.47
5 2.t5
6 1.95
7 1.68
8 1.55
9 1.58
10 l.7l
11 1.81
12 2.00
Funds Securities
5.31 0.03
1.21 0.03
9.35 0.2t
13.31 0.48
13.88 1.29
14J5 2'14
15.78 4.24
16.04 5.13
16.14 6.11
16.34 6'92
t6.64 7.73
Funds Securities Sumg.37 r.2O 10'57
r 1.93 0.75 12'68
8.01 0'68 8'70
6.17 1.16 7 '33
s.08 1'15 6'22
4.55 1.00 5'55
4.13 0.98 5'12
4.47 0.94 5'4r
4.g3 r.23 6'16
5.48 1.60 7'09
6.38 2'33 8'71
7.45 3'40 10'8s
Purchased
Qtrs MoneYSum
5.34
7.24
9.56
13.19
15.17
t7.48
20.02
21.11
22.25
23.26
24.38
n
J
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11 
.
t2
0.18
0.77
1.11
0.85
1.56
2.51
3.41
5.84
9.11
12.41
14.16
11.20
16.75 8.38 25.13
Thus, the securities and purchased 
funds *11f" more sensitive to moneary 
I
condition in recent v""J-ii'i' i' also shown 
i; i;blt 1' The percentage of I
securities and purchaseiir"i, ".p*ined 
bv 
"rJ;;;;i'"t*tiq in 
the post-
re80 period. rhis is 'i"*" i'-in" 
;*".tf*i$Ttl:rlJ::'ililX!;
fliffi'""fiffi :::i]:'::[llii:l:.'"Tp'*ni*:::*rnr'rt'ffi }J
til,"r="trt:::"fi ,iTti[:'""$:+**.*Lt*"iffi',i:13:,il,1:il;;;;il significanttv forthe tn:n -t:1fi" t-"J"r. di.cos,"d earlier
ffil-'.'J;il11"*:"fm'i:'$1ff."ri:'Jn"#'i-'""r'oansrheresurt
also indicare less effort made b1 91T:i: T::*:tii:1il"#i:fr:;'+l:
;:3.lliffi:""ti:!IEr!.T';1"i1I.#;;"';""*,i',"#:::,i;'#:Ji:in"*at;n;;t, in loan shielding bv the comr
the increase i'npo*un"Joi'tt'"n"'"t"*-loans 
or changing banking strate$es'
ffi 
'..*;;i ffiffi::1,":hi1ffii,.,* ffi ::il"ix:TiilT,l$
riuourirution and innovati:' 'h1-s::^::":?1"ffi;. f-u,it i"naing does nor
fi i'$:il?ilillffi 1i:"'illiil{'"*:"'}-riil*"1[::lf ;:f, ,ffi :t"J
kll*l*ru;::':#il::::3'",i:T'tli"i:"''#; ;" 
offse"he nela'live
errectormonetarv'"'flT:i":;:!"'l*i::"1,:-ry;"'1"frt:;";"$tT:l:
L
iitff :;j H ::ff""'"#":::TJi: fi[13ir3 1"" "i on' wi th respect to the
current trend of nnun"'iJrouuil'ution 
tt'i' *"J*ing influence on the bank
fudal Liberalization, Innovation and the Response of Malaysian 5l
Hrce sheet highlights the importance of external factors in the conduct of
cary policy. Experience in early nineties in which sudden surged in
,"tmel borrowings by Malaysian commercial banks exert upward pressure
r dmestic prices. commercial banks funding opportuniti"r ar" no longer
rticted by political borders. Liberalization and innovation widened theHting base and therefore domestic banking activities could deviate from[* of domestic monetary authority.
CONCLUSION
ht models of monetary equilibrium suggest the importance of bank in
the effect of monetary policy. Understanding the response of banks
changes in monetary policy is a critical element in studying the effec_
; of monetary policy. Traditional passive role of banking firm is now
by an active role which allows banking decisions to influence the
of monetary policy. In addition to their profit objectives, financial
liberalization and innovation have change the conduct of banking firms
years. This study investigates the response of Malaysian commercial
porrfolios to monetary shocks. comparison of responses of the whole(1971:l-1994:IV) with the responses during the liberalization years
-1994:IV) shows that bank lending are no longer directly influence by
metary changes. Bank internal strategies are pursued to offset the nega-
cffect of monetary contraction on bank lending. This is achieved by
hion of securities and also attracting purchased funds at a competitiv;
This reduces the direct influence of the central bank on banking opera-
ad therefore weakens fhe effectiveness of monetary policy. Banking
rx, particularly portfolio allocations, affect the final outcome of changes
policy. Therefore, banking decisions must be properly modeled
general equilibrium framework that identifies the effects of monetary
on the economy. The findings imply that monetary authority has lost
dits direct control over the bauking system as liberalization and inno-
have taken place. Thus, Fuerst's (1994: 375) call for more banking
in monetary theory is strongly agreed with.
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